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Dark	web:	The	economics	of	online	drugs	markets
Like	many	other	consumer	transactions,	the	buying	and	selling	of	drugs	are	increasingly	moving	online.	This	is
one	very	visible	dimension	of	cybercrime	–	and	it	has	been	receiving	growing	attention	from	researchers	as	the
online	drugs	markets	have	expanded	rapidly.
A	key	feature	of	online	drugs	platforms	is	that	they	are	located	on	the	so-called	‘dark	web’,	which	is	accessible	via
the	sophisticated	technology	of	anonymisation	software	and	encryption	programs,  and	buying	and	selling
transactions  are	conducted	using	the	anonymous	cryptocurrency,	Bitcoin.
Our	research	so	far	has	empirically	studied	these	online	drugs	platforms	by	scraping	large	amounts	of	data	from
their	websites	and	by	focusing	specifically	on	three	economic	questions:
First,	we	have	conducted	an	appraisal	and	empirical	analysis	of	the	buyer	ratings	of	online	drugs	purchases
that	the	platforms	collect.
Second,	we	are	looking	at	whether	these	ratings	act	to	generate	a	reputation	mechanism	for	sellers	in	the
illegal	online	market	setting	as	happens	in	legal	online	markets.
Third,	we	are	analysing	the	dynamics	of	the	market,	as	both	seller	turnover	and	platform	turnover	are	high
in	online	drugs	markets.
While	there	is	a	small	scale	prior	history	of	drugs	being	bought	and	sold	online,	the	origins	of	today’s	online	drugs
markets	date	back	to	the	establishment	of	‘Silk	Road’,	the	best	known	platform,	in	January	2011.	Silk	Road
distinguished	itself	from	the	black	markets	that	had	been	operating	before	by	its	highly	professional	website	and
its	ability	to	ensure	anonymity.	Figure	1	shows	a	sample	screenshot	of	the	site.
Figure	1.	Sample	screenshot	of	Silk	Road,	the	pioneering	online	drugs	platform
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Silk	Road	operated	for	just	under	three	years	before	being	shut	down	following	the	arrest	of	its	founder,	Ross
Ulbricht,	the	libertarian	who	set	up	and	ran	the	site	(under	the	administrator	name,	‘Dread	Pirate	Roberts’)	and
who	is	currently	serving	a	life	sentence	for	doing	so.	Trade	on	the	site	grew	massively	over	its	time	of	operation:
in	May	2011,	it	had	around	340	listings;	by	the	time	of	its	closure	in	October	2013,	there	were	around	13,000
drugs	listings	on	the	platform.
Figure	2.	Lifetimes	of	83	online	drugs	platforms
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Since	the	demise	of	Silk	Road,	a	large	number	of	online	drugs	platforms	have	come	and	gone,	some	lasting	only
a	few	days,	but	others	running	longer	–	and	making	a	lot	of	money.	Figure	2	shows	the	lifetimes	of	83	dark	web
drugs	platforms	and	names	some	of	the	larger	sites.
For	our	research,	data	were	scraped	from	four	of	the	largest	online	drugs	platforms	–	Agora,	Evolution,	Nucleus
and	Silk	Road	2.0	–	between	2013	and	2016	and	then	analysed	to	present	evidence	on	the	economic	functioning
of	online	drugs	markets.
A	key	research	question	is	how	well  –	or	badly	–	these	markets	operate	given	the	high	probability	of	problems	of
‘moral	hazard’	arising	because	of	their	illegal	nature	and	because	they	are	populated	by	individuals	engaged	in
criminal	actions.	Some	of	the	findings	come	from	analysing	these	data	in	ways	similar	to	other	research	on	legal
online	markets,	such	as	eBay	or	Amazon,	where	there	is	a	focus	on	whether	online	activity	alters	the	way	in
which	trust	between	market	participants	operates	and	whether	it	affects	the	efficiency	of	outcomes.
A	particular	emphasis	has	been	placed	on	whether	online	activity	enhances  or	diminishes	seller	reputations	so
that	problems	of	moral	hazard	either	improve	or	deteriorate	in	the	context	of	online	commerce	(see	Cabral	and
Hortaçsu,	2010).	Buyers	might	be	concerned	about	the	quality	of	the	products	they	are	looking	to	buy	and
therefore	forgo	purchasing	opportunities.	At	the	same	time,	sellers	might	worry	whether	they	will	be	paid.
Some	striking	findings	emerge.
Analysis	of	around	1.5	million	drugs	transactions	scraped	from	the	four	platforms	(plus	data	on	Silk	Road	from
Christin,	2012)	shows	that,	for	the	most	part,	online	drugs	markets	function	without	the	significant	problems	of
moral	hazard	that	a	priori	one	might	think	would	constrain	their	operation.
In	fact,	only	a	small	minority	of	online	drugs	deals	receive	bad	ratings	from	buyers,	as	Table	1	shows.	This	is
lower	than	the	incidence	of	drugs	rip-offs	that	researchers	have	reported	in	analyses	of	the	quality	of	drugs
available	from	street	transactions	(Galenianos	et	al,	2012).
Moreover,	as	with	legal	online	markets,	if	sellers	do	receive	bad	ratings,	this	typically	leads	to	them	experiencing
significant	sales	reductions	and	market	exit.	Thus,	perhaps	contrary	to	what	many	people’s	first	intuition	might	be,
reputation	mechanisms	appear	to	work	relatively	well	even	in	these	illegal	online	marketplaces.
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Our	research	also	finds	that	drugs	platforms	exit	and	get	closed	down	for	different	reasons.	As	the	online	drugs
markets	have	emerged	and	grown	rapidly,	they	have	attracted	attention	from	both	the	media	and	law
enforcement	agencies.
Table	1.	Negative	ratings	of	drugs	transactions
Notes:	Silk	Road	data	from	Christin	(2012).	Silk	Road	2.0,	Agora,	Evolution	and	Nucleus	data	from	downloads	of	each	dark	web
platform	collected	in	Bhaskar	et	al	(2017).
As	a	result,	some	have	been	seized	and	shut	down.	Others	have	undertaken	exit	scams	and	run	off	with	the
money	they	were	holding	(in	Bitcoins	often	running	into	millions	of	pounds).	Thus,	the	market	has	become
characterised	by	platform	(and	seller)	entry	and	exit.	It	is	interesting	to	consider	whether	this	has	had	a	deterrent
effect	on	potential	buyers	and	sellers.
An	examination	of	what	happens	  to	the	online	drugs	market	when	large	platforms	exit	suggests	no	evidence	of
deterrence.	In	fact,	the	markets	seem	to	bounce	back	rapidly	and	get	bigger	as	sellers	migrate	quickly	to	different
sites	and	continue	to	ply	their	trade	online.
Our	research	has	looked	at	three	specific	cases:	the	well-known	seizure  of	the	original	Silk	Road;	the	shutdown  of
its	successor	Silk	Road	2.0	by	law	enforcement	agencies;	and	the	exit	scam	by	the	then	market	leader,	Evolution.
There	is	no	evidence	that	these	large  scale	exits	deterred	buyers	or	sellers	from	continuing	to	engage	in	online
drugs	sales	and	purchases,	with	new	platforms	rapidly	arising	to	replace	those	taken	down.
Very	recently	–	in	July	2017	–	the	then	market	leader	AlphaBay	was	taken	down,	along	with	another	relatively
large	platform,	Hansa.	But	again,	despite	widespread	media	coverage,	this	also	seems	not	to	have	reduced
sellers’	appetite	for	selling	drugs	online	as	new	sites	rapidly	expanded	in	terms	of	drugs	listings	following	the
shutdown.	Table	2	reproduces	data	showing	this	for	four	out	of	five	platforms	in	the	week	at	the	end	of	July	2017
after	AlphaBay	and	Hansa	were	seized.
So	despite	high	turnover	of	the	platforms	that	host	the	buyers	and	sellers	of	drugs,	the	online	drugs	market
seems	resilient.	As	with	legal	online	markets,	illegal	online	markets	are	substituting	for	offline	economic	activity
(street	transactions	in	the	case	of	drugs)	as	buyers	and	sellers	increasingly	operate	online:	a	trend	that	seems
unlikely	to	end	any	time	soon.	Thus,	it	seems	that	the	role	of	law	enforcement	in	the	‘war	on	drugs’	may	need	to
be	one	of	devoting	more	resources	and	finding	better	means	to	tackle	drug	buying	and	selling	in	the	cyber
domain.
Table	2.	Numbers	of	drug	listings	before	and	after	the	shutdown	of	AlphaBay	and	Hansa
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Notes:	Numbers	from	Cyberint	research,	as	reported	on	BBC	website,	1	August	2017.
♣♣♣
Notes:
Robin	Linacre	contributed	to	this	work	in	a	personal	capacity	and	in	his	own	time.	The	opinions	expressed
are	the	authors’	own,	and	the	research	is	not	linked	to	any	of	Robin	Linacre’s	work	for	the	Ministry	of
Justice.
This	blog	post	appeared	originally	on	CentrePiece,	the	magazine	of	LSE’s	Centre	for	Economic
Performance.	It	summarises	the	authors’	The	Economic	Functioning	of	Online	Drugs	Markets,	CEP
Discussion	Paper	No.	1490;	forthcoming	in	the	Journal	of	Economic	Behaviour	and	Organisation.
The	post	gives	the	views	of	its	authors,	not	the	position	of	LSE	Business	Review	or	the	London	School	of
Economics.
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